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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-vs-

Case No.

KENNETH SHARP, GEORGE
CHRISTENSEN, and JAMES
N. TUCKER,

16147, 16040,
and 16019

Defendants-Appellants.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

ST.:'ITE:lENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
~poellants

Sharp and Christensen were charged by

co~olaint

and

·:islc;~ion

o£ Ctah Coce An:-;otated §

a:1d

~lth

i~formation

with theft of a motor vehicle, a
76-6-40~

(1953), as amended,

aiding the escape of a person from official custody,

a violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-8-310

(1953) as amended.

Appellant Tucker was also charged with theft of a
motor vehicle and with the crime of escape from official
::c:stoc::, a violation of Ctah Code J'.,nnotated § 76-8-309

~p~cllants

Sharp and

C~ristensen

appeal both

(1953),

of
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their convictions.

Appellant Tucker appeals his conviction

for theft but does not challenge his conviction of escape
from official custody.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Following a trial by jury before the Honorable
Bryant H. Croft on August 3 and 4,
found guilty as chargee.

1978, appellants were

Each appellant was given two

concurrent sentences of one to fifteen years in the Utah
State Prison to be served following completion of the
sentences

t~~

•

~ere

currently serving.

RELIE? SQUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmation of the convictions
and sentences of aopellants.
ST.;n::tE:jT OF TP.I: F."-.CTS
On .Z..pril 18,
in

t~e

~ini~urn

security

He was serving an
years for the

1978,

ar:,;~,ellar,t

co~po~nd

i~determinate

cri~e

of rape

(R.

7ucker ·A·as a prisoner

of the Ctah State Prison.
sentence of one to fifteen
at 139, State's Exhibit 2-5)

and had not been paroled or pardoned

(R. at 191, State's

Exr.ibit 3-::i) . .:O.?;_:Jella:',ts S'"-,aro and Chri:ct<?n:cen v;ere also
confined in minir,tuc. security at t!"".e

convictions and 90-daj· presente:-.ce
(?.

at 19 3,

State's

E::~'li::;._i

':.:::

~

s a:-::-1

?riso~

:ollm,·ing felony

e·:.?tluatio:~

Cs

cc~r:-~lt~er,:.s

1.
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left with another inmate named Brooks along a ditch on
Prison property to carry out a work detail at about 1:00
p.m.

Appellant Tucker had on a blue shirt and headband.

Appellant Sharp had an orange shirt stuck in his pocket
and appellant Christensen had on an orange shirt (R. at
206-209).
At about 3:00 p.m., Prison Instructor Paul
Christensen, who was supervising the work detail, noticed
inmate Brooks walking alone toward the minimum security
area of the Prison

(R. at 211).

Upon investigation, the

shovels which had been issued to appellants were discovered,
one lying at the end of the ditch, the other two where the
men had begun working

(R. at 211).

After an unsuccessful

attempt to locate appellants, Mr. Christensen notified Prison
Cont~o1

that an escape had occurred

(R. at 213).

A head

cc'-1:1t ·,.;as i:T"-cediate1y conducted and it 1,·as discovered that
a;::;::e11ants v:ere, indeed, missing

(R.

at 224, 225).

At about the same time, 3:00p.m. on April 18, 1978,
two female employees of Riverton City were sitting in the
citj
~~e
:o

cf~ices
~en

at

~ore

and noticed three men walking together (R. at 230).
blue shirts and denim pants.

2~l-23:2).

One wore a headband.

Riverton Police Chief, Leonard Smock,

2lso sa~ the men and noted that one of them wore a turquoise
He identified another as apDellant Christensen
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Three men were also seen at about 3:00 p.m. as they
walked in front of Sav More T.V., a business two buildings
away from the Riverton City offices.

(R. at 240).

Again,

all three were wearing blue shirts and one wore a headband.
One man was again observed walking in front of Sav More, and
shortly thereafter, people in the building heard a car startinc
~'rc

(R. at 241 and 249).

'-:arcia Ruark testified that she ran

out in time to see her white 1971 Cadillac being driven away
to the north

(R.

at 249)

She had not authorized anyone to

take the

(R.

at 250)

She promptly notified the police

(R.

at 28'i).

Police

C~ie~

Smock and Officer Whipple ?Ot into

two pollee cars and be;an a search for the

vehicle.

~issing

The car was quickly located and a chase began durina
the vehicles reached speeds of 90 m.p.h.

~hich

(R. at 286).

Chie~

Smock noted that there were three occucants in the car, one
with a headband

a~d

another with a turquoise shirt

The chase led to 3utterfie!d

Ca~yon

~here

(R. at 287).

the Cadillac was

found abandoned in the road.

T~o

persons were headinc through

the oak brush.

Deputy Sheriff Curtis

~ielson

testified that while he was searching the mountainside he
apprehended

ac~ellant

Share

hi~ing

under a tree.

turquoise shirt \·.·c.s fo·Jnd '.-:ith hi:-;1 ro

into custody as

C~r~st0~s~n

~:~~

tr· 1:-

M

:;t 305-307\.

J._,_"

::. 'l

- :;~
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brush

(R. at 313).
Larry Debillo had been driving in the area with

his wife and had stopped at a roadblock conducted by prison
officers.

They gave him a flyer with a picture and descrip-

tion of appellant Tucker (R. at 255).

As Mr. Debillo was

driving toward Lark, Utah he saw appellant Tucker hitchhiking
and picked him up
(R. at 256).

(R. at 257-258).

Mr. Debillo was armed

After driving for a while, Mr. Debillo took

appellant Tucker into custody and sent his wife for the
sheriff

(R.

at 259-261).

Appellant Tucker testified for the defense and
indicated that he had left the Prison work detail

(R. at 340)

anc had met appellants Christensen and Sharp in Riverton.
He said he had been drinking
later as
a~pellant

~e

(R. at 344).

He claimed that

and appellant Sharp were walking along the road,

Christensen creve up in the white Cadillac.

Tucker

testi:ied that he and Sharp joined Christensen in the car
and together they headed toward the Prison.
then decided to go for a ride.
c~ase

~e

d~d

W~en

However, they

the police began the

7ucker die not ask the others to stop the car because
not want the police to catch him

(R. at 346 and 347).

After deliberation,_ the jury found appellant Tucker
• '•
s~arp

of

~heft

and Escape from

o~ficial

custody and appellants

and Christensen guilty of Theft and Aiding Escape

~R.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLANTS SHARP ANI1 CHRISTENSEN I-JERE
PROPERLY CONVICTED OF AIDING THE ESCAPE
OF APPELLANT TUCKER.
A

THE CONDUCT OF APPELLANTS
WAS WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THE
ESCAPE/AIDI~G ESCAPE STATUTES.
Appellants Starp 3nd Christensen contend that their
conduct was not sufficient to constitute a violation of Utah
Code )\r,r_ot=.tec § 76-8-310

(1953),

as amended, v:hich provides:

perso~

is quilty of an offense if:
He =.i:':s J.nother person to escape
from official custody:.
An offense under this section is a
felony of the second degree if:
b) A person to whon the aid .
is
given is a prisoner confined in
a)

(2)

~~e

sta~e

Escape from Official Custocy

(1)
(2)

prison.
lS

prescribed by rtah Coce ;..nn.

A person is guilty of cscaFe if he
escapes fron official custody.
The offense is a felony of the second
degree if:.
b) The actor escapes frorr confinement
in the state prison.

P\·

--l~·= i~.c
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be aiding an escape, appellants argue that there was no
proof of the necessary acts or intent to constitute the
crime charged.

Nevertheless, a careful reading of the

cases cited by appellants reveals that appellants' interpretation of the Utah statutes is unduly restrictive and
that conviction in this matter is consistent with the law
of aiding escape throughout the country.
In Orth v. United States, 252 F. 566

(5th Cir.

1918), the defendant had been convicted on two counts.
Each count involved a seperate portion of a federal statute.
The first count charged that the defendant had aided an
escaped prisoner.
had

allo~ed

hii"l on his
~c~ore

~~at

The facts indicated that the defendant

an escapee to hide in his home and then sent
~;·ay.

The escapee had been free for some days

the defendant rendered any aid.

The Court ruled

conviction for aiding the escape was improper but

not:eC.:

This conclusion does not effect
(sic) the conviction on the second
count charging that the defendant
harbored and concealed. (Id. at 568)
The defendant's sentence

~as

affirmed.

L:r:lif::e the L'nited States Code c.s applied in Orth,
c_

-~,
ac~

t

,.-_

the Ctah Code does not contain a statute proscribing
of

~artoring

or aidino an escaped prisoner.

Moreover,

c= uc-o:oe c" conduct undertaken by all appellants in this

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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matter indicates an on-going act.

Within the space of a

few hours appellants walked away from the prison, took a
car and attempted to elude the police.

There was ample

evidence from which the jury could and did infer an ongoing attempt to elude authorities and complete an escape
to freedom.

Given the locale of the prison, it is clear

that no escapee can get far without some transportation.
Unlike Orth, where

~ne

esc'l._t:;ee had been at large for

several days before the defendant gave aid, appellants
Sharp and Christensen left the prison at or near the same
time as

·r~ellan~

corroboratlng in a
time

t~ereafter.

Tucker and all three were actively
atte~pt
l·:~ile

to avoid police a very short

tne narrm,· reading of "escape" "'·as

appropriate in Orth where the conduct of the defendant
remained criminal under another more applicable portion of
the same statute, in
provision.

~tah

there is no specific alternate

The lack of such a provision indicates that

t~e

escape and aiding escape statutes should be read broadly
enough to include help rendered during the entire attempt
by the escapee to place himself beyond the reach of legal
authori::y.

Apoellants Sharp and Christensen

Appellant Tucker avoid re-capture
they

~ere

all

d~s=overed

~issin0

~ithin

fro~

~ere

helping

an hour of

the sa:10

~or}:

~hen

d0~ail
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at the prison.

It would be unduly restrictive to rule

that aid given so soon after a departure from the prison
as part of such a clearly continuous course of events was
not aiding the escape of appellant Tucker.
Other authority cited by appellants supports a
more broad reading of the Utah statutes.

In State v. Jones,-

36 P.2d 530 (Idaho 1934), a prisoner was working outside
the jail under the suoervision

of a deputy.

Although he

was supposed to be delivering coal, he went, instead, to the
house of a friend with whom he had left some money he had
stolen.

His friend,

the defendant, gave him some money

and sent him on his way.

Although the court cited People v.

Quijada, 53 Cal..ZI.op 39, 199 P. 854

(1921) to state the narrow

ce:initicn of escape, the court held that the escapee was
in the lawful custody of the deputy when he was assisted
by the defendant

(36 P.2d at 531),

e~en

cone where he was not authorized to go.

though he had clearly
The defendant's

conviction for aiding escape was affirmed.

Just as in Jones,

the actions of appellants Sharp and Christensen in this matter
were rendered contemporaneously with Appellant Tucker's
escape
~:J

an~

made it possible for appellant Tucker

:_Jlace '1imself comfortably beyond the immediate reach of

2_.~ho::_-it~·.

State ex rel. Farrior v. Faulk, 136 So. 601 (Fla.,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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1931), cited by appellants, did not involve an aiding escape
The escapee had left the jail and had gone into a

charge.

neighboring county.

The sheriff of that county arrested

him and sought expenses and transportation costs from the
original county.

The court held that the escapee was an

escaped prisoner and that the sheriff was able to arrest and
~~~

was entitled to costs.

rcl~ng

was clearly made in the

interests of orderly and efflcient police work.

There was

absolutely no indication of how the court might have ruled
upon the

~us~~

~n

of when help given to an escapee may

properly be termed as

aidi~g

the escape.

In People v. Quintero, 67 Mich. App.
2d 251

481,

~.W.

241

(1976), the question of aiding escape was, again, not

an issue.
defenda~t

It was not clear in that case whether the escapeehad been found off or on the prison ground.

The

court said that he "escapes if he re'n.oves himself :rom the
imposed restraint over his person and ':clition."

(Id. at 252\.

The evidence in the instant matter indicates that appellants
were all trying to do just that-remove themselves from
restraint over their persons and volition.

They were discove!

missing at about 3:00 p.m. and were seen driving
car not their

c~n

within

it

~as

=~~

separated,

a

~he
'.·~~·.·

half hour.
s~c~t

~i~e.

If
~

the~·

a~ay

in a

~ere

ever

?e~~ectl~·

acc~~tat

logical in:':erence :or the jcry to ha··e ~a=ce ·.-:c. s t~c.t all
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appellants left the prison together.

In any event, in

light of the absence of a harboring statute in Utah the
narrow view that one may aid an escape only by acting
before or as the escapee leaves the narrowest physical
confines of his confinement would 'be unjust.

In this

case appellants acted in concert during or very shortly
after their departure from prison property to make good
their getaway.

The time interval was so short as to make

consecutive events of walking away, stealing the car,
and eluding police one continuous transaction.
B

THE NECESSARY INTENT ELEMENT
I~ AS SHOI'i'N BY THE EVIDENCE.
Appellants contend that the necessary intent element
was not shown and that their conviction was therefore defective.

Appellants correctly note that where a specific intent

is not provided for a crime, a c~lpable mental state is
required, Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-102

(1953), as amended.

However, it is well established that criminal intent may
be inferred and need not be shown by direct evidence.

See

State v. Minousis, 64 Utah 206 at 211-212, 228 P. 574 (1924)
a~:d State v.

Kazda, 15 C.2d 313, 392 P.2d 486 at 488

(1964).

Appellants contend ·that the intent element for
aidins escape must be the same as for escape under Utah Code
,~.:-:n.

c; 76-2-202 (1953), as amended.

Even if they are correct,
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it does not follow from the evidence that the jury could
not have concluded that appellants Sharp and Christensen
did not intend to effectuate an escape when they acted as
they did.

In Luke v.

State,

49 Ala.

30

(1873)

the defendants

were charged with arson for burning a hole in the jail
floor.

The elements of arson required that the fire be

set for an illegal

~JPcase

in that the defendants

The court found such purpose

w~re

~iding

each other to escape.

All three appellants here were confined in the Gtah State
Priso;--,.

later,

reJ all did their best, both together and then,
2~art,

::.:--. ci:c,c.

"'t

tc e·:ade re-=aoture.

Their tactic of running

directions after abanconing the car increased

the chances that one or more

mig~t

?Et

a\\a~·

~ro~ ~hich

the

jury could infer an intent to aid each other in their
.:..s i!l. LJke,

c~pellc:-'."':5

3ctc:=: ir: ::c>r:cert to

achieve an escane.
In State v

I-~avarro,

~6~

'-'-·

lC13

(.l-1ainc,

l9J:.?),

the

court noted that "aiding a:1 esca::Je is a:1y c\·e:ct act \·:'-',ich is
intended to assist an attencted or conpleted departure of
a prisoner from lawful custody before he is discharced by
d~J.e

process of l:J.\·:.

11

{I,:.

2t 104).

l - _.... '
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and Sharp after leaving the Prison) , they clearly aided him
attem~t

in his further

to evade authority.

together in evading re-capture.

All three acted

The intent to assist each

other, as noted above, is clearly inferrable from their
actions.
Finally, State v. Cooper, 113 N.J.Super 34, 272
A.2d 557

(1971), supports this conclusion.

In that case

the defendant started a jail riot during which two prisoners
escaped.

He was found guilty of aiding their escape.

The

court stated that it was not necessary to show actual particication in the escape or any intent to aid the escape.
The court said the defendant should have known that his
acts could create a possibility for escape and affirmed
t~e

c~

ca~~iction.

~~;ella~ts

T~e

S~arp

Tucker to

a~pel~a~t

T~cker ~as,

facts here are much stronger.

The acts

and Christensen clearly went to aiding
~ake

his

esca~e

complete.

They knew

like themselves, incarcerated in the prison and

1t was clearly

in~errable

that they knew and intended that

their actions would create a possibility for Tucker's escape.
Appellants contend further that there was no
e· ~dc~ce of a specific intent to aid appellant Tuc~er's
They s•·· that they, appellants Sharp and Christensen,
~re

c·-:l

enca;1ng in a Class B

~isdemeanor

escape when
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appellant Tucker happened along.

By so arguing,

they

concede that escape is an on-going crime since, according
to appellant Tucker's testimony, he met his co-defendants
outside the prison.

But even more important is the fact

that from the moment the evidence puts the three together
in Riverton there was clearly a common intent and effort
to avoid re-capture.
they were on fo0t

i~

They were hardly "clean away" when
~iverton

in prison clothing.

They

were in a car, running away from the police within less than
an hour of when they were reported missing at the prison.
T':co-- --ere all co::-uritt2_ng the sar.<e physical c.cts--the only
difference bet:l-een the Class B Misdemeanor of appellants
S~ar?

and

Chris~ensen

and the second degree felony of

appellant Tucker was the technical status of the men at:
the prison.
to

corr~·it

Clearly the

~Jry

could have

inferre~

an intent

the crime of ai:'Oing the escaoe of appellant Tucker

on behalf of

aooellan~s

Sharp and Christensen.

This conclusic

is supoorted by the holding of the court in State v.
490 P.2

511

(Or.J..pp.,

19/l)

Stark,

cited b;,- appellants at p.ll.

In that case the defendant and several of his friends had
picked up two hitchhikers.

The

hi~chhikers

were rotbed end

defendant contended "that to find ':ir-, cuilty o!' the unarr,ed
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held that the following instruction was proper:
It is sufficient if the defendant,
William Gerald Stark .
. was oresent
when the robbery was committed,- and
acquiesced therein, with a common
criminal intent or purpose.
All three appellants were escaping from authority.
They were doing it together and were acting in such a way
as to aid each other.

This was clearly shown by the evidence

and the verdicts were proper.

c
THE RULE OF STATE V. SHONDEL
IS INAPPLICABLE TO THE FACTS
OF THIS CASE.
Appellants contend that under the case of State
\". Shondel, 22 C.2d 343, 453 P.2d 146 (1969) and this Court's
~ore

recent affirmations of the rule of that case, they were

i~properly

charged and sentenced.

Respondent respectfully

submits that appellants have misread Shondel.
and the cases
P.2d 168

~hich

(1969);

In Shondel

followed, State v. Fair,23 U.2d 34, 456

Ramrnell v. Smith, 560 P.2d 1108

(Utah 1977);

and State v. Loveless, 581 P.2d 575 (Utah 1978), the concern
~as

always with two statutes creating the same crime but

specifying separate penalties.
~SD

In Shondel, possession of

was prohibited in two statutes.

cr1me a
~roblems

~isjemeanor

One statute made the

and another made it a felony.

Similar

were posed in the subsequent cases cited above.
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A fundamental difference between those cases and the matter
at hand is that the defendants in those cases could not
have been charged with or convicted of violating both statutes.
The court had to make a choice as to which statute to proceed
In this case the supposedly conflicting statutes

under.

proscribe escape and aiding escape.

In aiding appellant

Tucker's escape, appellants Sharp and Christensen committed
ln effectuating their own escape,

a second degree :Z<= -;.c:::,.

appellants Sharp and Christensen committed a Class B

~1isdemeanc

It is well-established that within one episode or continuous
cours~

G~

conduct an actor may commit more than one crime,

Utah Coie .J.nn.
has

tee~

~ade

§

76-l-402

(1953), as amended.

11oreover, it

clear by this Court that when two crimes are

COI11.'Tii ttea, neither of

~-,·hic'1

may be tried 'A'i thin the same

court, that they may be tried separately.
Cooley, 5"75 P.2d 693

(Utah

~918)

See State v.

•..:here t'1e cefendant had

commi tte·d three offenses \·:-'- t'!in the sarc.e course of conduct.
~wo

of the offenses were Class B misdemeanors and one was

an indictable misdemeanor.

The Court held that separate

prosecutions in the District Court and the Justice Court
o~

Conviction of aidinc the escape
Tucker did not preclude

t~e

state from

fu~ther

C·f appell_a:ct's SharD ac.::i C".ristens n foe·

tl~e

arpellant

~rcsecution

cri.>~

•:f escane.
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crimes.

The fact that one act creates two separate criminal

results does not prohibit the prosecution of both

crimes.

Under Shondel when achievement of the same criminal result
may result in differing penalties, the lesser penalty must
be imposed.

No such choice is mandated in this case.

Appellants were, therefore, properly charged and convicted.
Their verdicts and sentences should be affirmed.
POINT II
APPELLANTS l'i'ERE PROPERLY CONVICTED
OF THEFT OF AN OPERABLE MOTOR VEHICLE
AND THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED
AN INSTRUCTION ON THE LESSER INCLUDED
OFFENSE OF TEMPORARILY DEPRIVING AN
0\'i'NER OF A VEHICLE.
Appellants concede the establishment of all the
ele~ents

of the crime of theft of an operable motor vehicle

except for intent to permanently deprive (Appellants' Brief
o. -c p.

18) .

They contend that the evidence was ambiguous

o~

that element

1~

not

a~d

i~structing

that the trial court committed error
the jury on the lesser included offense

of joyriding, as they requested.

Respondent submits that

the evidence clearly indicated that the offense of appellants
was not joyriding and that they were guilty of the offense
o~

which they were convicted.
Ctah Code .".nnotated

c ~- 0\" i

§

-;"6-6-404

(1953), as amended,

s :

.". nerson commits theft if he
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obtains or exercises unauthorized
control over the property of another
with a purpose to deprive him thereof.
Utah Code Annotated§ 76-6-401(3)

(1953), as amended provides

further:
Purpose to deprive means to have
the conscious object: To withhold property permanently or for so extended
a period or to use under such circumstances that a substantial portion of
its eccno~ic value, or of the use and
benefit ~her~of, would be lost;
In State v. Romero, 554 P.2d 216 at 218

(Utah 1976) this

Court held that:
The intent to steal or unlawfully
deprive the rightful owners of their
property can be inferred by defendant's
conduct and the attendant circumstances
testified to by the ~itnesses.
In State v. Gillian, 23 U.2d 372, 463 P.2d 811 at 812

(1970)

this Court quoted State v. Johnson, 112 U. 130, 185 P.2d
738

(1947)

to say:
That the defendant is entitled to have
the jury instructed on his theory of the
case if there is any substantial evidence
to justify giving such an instruction.
(EmDhasis in original).

In State v.

Doughert~

550 P.2d 175 at 176-177

(Utah 1976)

this Court further noted that an instruction on a lesser
included offense say be refused ''if the prosecution has
its burde~ of proof on ~he greater offense,

~nd

evidence te:1ding to reduce the greater offense.

t~ere

~et

is no

II
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The evidence in this matter clearly demonstrated
that appellants intent was to permanently deprive the owner
of her automobile.

Ap?ellants contend that because there

1'as no significant damage done to the vehicle and that the
vehicle was recovered only a short distance from the point
of taking within a relatively short time that-the court
must necessarily have concluded that appellants only intended
to make temporary use of the vehicle.

While the facts noted

by appellants are in the record, they do not present a
complete picture of what transpired and should not be viewed
out of context.

The only reason the car was recovered

quickly with minimal damage was because police reacted almost
i:nmediately to the theft.
a high-speed chase
~ossession

The automobile was abandoned after

(R. at 294).

The fact of temporary

does not and should not be taken to indicate an

intent to possess temporarily.

On the contrary, the fact

that appellants were escaped prisoners trying to elude recaotu~e

indicated clearly that they had no intention of

returning the car to its owner after a short drive in the
:-.e i ghtorhood.

Appellant Tucker's testimony that they were

cnly trying to return to prison with the car is totally
inconsistant with all the other evidence.

If they were

returning to custody, why did they flee from the police both
in the car and then, later, on foot?

Moreover, even if
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Tucker's testimony were believable, there was no indication
that appellants would have done anything to see that the
owner of the automobile would have recovered the vehicle
within a short period of time, if ever.

Several cases from other jurisdictions are instructiv
In People v. Hutchins, 20 Cal Rptr.

on this point.

(Cal. App., 1962)
of an

automob~le.

497

the defendant was charged with grand theft
He had rented a car from a Hertz outlet

in Long Beach but had not returned the car on the agreed date.
The car was, in fact, left abandoned on or near another
Bectz lot at the Los Angeles airport.
the evidence
t~e

~as

The court held that

sufficient to prove that the defendant took

car with the intent to deprive the owner of title to and

possession of the vehicle.
I:1 ?.obinson v. CorEmom;ealth, 190 Va. 134, 56 S.E.2d
367

(1949)

the defendant a:1d others broke into a car dealershi:

and took a new ?ord automobile.

The car was found several

The defendant was convicted of theft and

conte~de

on appeal that he was guilty of unauthorized use, not theft.
The court held:
In the case at bar the conduct
of the de£8ndant negati\~es an~· iCea
that ~Je ir.":ende~ to C·2pri':e the Oh"ner
of the car t~mpcraril~·.
~e ~id no act
~rior ~o his ar~est tc l:ldicote tl1 t
o·v:ne~.

On

t~e

o~ner

h~n~,

~is

con uct
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and testimony disclose that he intended
to deprive the owner of the car permanently.
This is the only conclusion
that can be reached from the evidence.
The circumstances under which the car
was taken, and his actions regarding
it afterwards, including his abandoning
it in a public highway, show clearly
that he was guilty of the offense of
larceny and not of unauthorized use.
We do not think that the instruction
offered was proper, and the court did
not commit error in refusing it.
Id. at 372.
So also the facts in this case would not have
justified an instruction on the lesser included offense of
joyriding.

Appellants did nothing to indicate that they

had any intent other than to permanently deprive the owner
of possession.

They ran away from the police.

the autor;)obile.
:nanner.

They abandoned

They drove the car in a dangerously reckless

(R. at 290,294,

308,312).

They were escaped prisoners.

Apoellants should not benefit fro:n the quick and efficient
action of the Riverton Police in that an offense otherwise
a felony is reduced to a misdemeanor because they were quickly
aporehended.
APpellant relies upon State v. Cornish, 568 P.2d 360
(Ctah 1977).
there the

However, that case is distinguishabla in that

Co~rt

held that the jury was

on both the creater and lesser
o~

of~enses

intent was clearly in doubt.

~roperly

instructed

because the evidence

The defendant had presented
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evidence which tended to negate an intent to permantly
In this case the only possible evidence of such

deprive.

a nature was the un-supported, incredible assertions of
appellant Tucker that the car had been taken to return to
Even that testimony does not indicate any intent to

prison.

return the automobile to the owner, at best, it simply indicate
that the appellants may not have intended to travel a long
distance.

The car was recovered and returned quickly but not

through the actions of appellants.
In summary, an instruction on the lesser-included
offense of joyriding was not justified in this case since no
reasonable view of the evidence would have supported a convict:
of such

offense.

a~

~oreover,

the intent of appellants to

permantly deprive the owner of the stolen automobile was
clearly and properly inferrable from the evidence.
convictions were proper

a~d

The

should be affirmed.

PCI:\T III
SINCE E.:C,CH .1\PPELL.<;>-.;T ?.ECEI\'ECJ Ti·IO
EQUAL CONCURRE:\T SDlTE:\CES, A~ HlPROPER CONVICTIO~ ON O~E SENTENCE
IS HARMLESS ERROR.

Utah Code A:>n. §76-3-401(7)
that whenever two equal, concurrent
''::he~'

s~"J.all

sente~ces

lTierge into one sentence. '

all ap?ellants received

~~-:~

eq~2l,

(1953) as amended provid;

1

I~

the

co~cu~~e~t

are imposed,
instc~t

~atter,

s~n~~nces.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR,
may contain errors.
-22-

~he

practical effect is that each appellant has received one
sentence on two alternate theories of conviction.
Appellant Tucker does not challenge his conviction
of escape in this appeal.

Hence, even if the Court finds

that the conviction for theft of an automobile was defective,
appellant Tucker's sentence should stand unchanged.
Appellants Sharp and Christensen were convicted of
both aiding the escape of Tucker and of theft of an automobile.
In order for their sentences to be altered, this Court must
find that both of their convictions were defective.

If the

court finds that only one conviction is defective, their
sentences should also remain unchanged.

This is the same

circumstance which faced the court in Orth v. United States,
sc:pra, v:herein the defendant had been convicted upon two
counts, one of which was held improper.

The defendant's

sentence was left unaltered since conviction on the proper
count alone produced the penalty.
To capsulize, a finding by this Court that the
theft convictions were improper, by itself, would indicate
harmless error since the convictions of escape and aiding
escape would remain unchanged and the sentences of appellants
would remain the same.

Moreover, a finding that the aiding

escape convictions alone were defective would produce the
sa::-.e reslll t.

Unless this Court finds for appellants on all
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issues raised in this appeal, any error noted is harmless
error since the sentences of appellants would not be altered.
In any event, any finding of this Court on the issues raised
on behalf of appellant Tucker can have no bearing upon his
conviction and sentence since he does not challenge his
Any error with respect to appellant

conviction of escape.

Tucker is, therefore, harmless.
CONCLUSION
Appellants Sharp and Christensen were properly
charged with and convicted of aiding the escape of appellant
A proper interpretation of the relevant statutes
indicates that the actions of appellants Sharp and Christensen
went to aiding appellant Tucker to further his crime of escape
The fact that,

in the same criminal episode, appellants Sharp

and Christensen also

co~uitted

the crime of escape does not

bar their conviction and/or punishment for the crime of aidinc
the escape of Tucker.
All appellants were clearly guilty of theft of a
motor vehicle and not joyriding.

No reasonable view of the

evidence would have supported a conviction of joyriding and
the court properly refJsed an instruction on the lesser crime.
Appellants'
acts and the

intent to steal the car was inferrable from their
circ~8sta~ccs

Finall~·,

e•Jen

i~

of the
this

ta~~ina.

Co~rt

shculd

~ind

:or

appella~
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on some but not all of the issues raised in this appeal,
the error must be considered harmless since the convictions
and sentences of appellants Sharp and Christensen remain
essentially unchanged unless they prevail on all issues
raised.

In any event, appellant Tucker has not challenged

his escape conviction and a finding that his conviction for
automobile theft was defective would not alter his sentence
and should be regarded as harmless.
The convictions and sentences of appellants should
be sustained as proper.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
EARL F. DORIUS
Assistant Attorney General
Attor~eys

for Respondent
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